Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological Building on and extending Fodor’s earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat of. Mind. ( hence. RTM. ; for discussion see., among other sources.,. Fodor.,. FA. ; Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of. Mind Jerry Fodor, as the leading philosophical exponent of cognitive science, has sparked.

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In us, it might be that we interpret our experience as picking out the one rather than all the alternatives because our language allow us to carve things up in this fine-grained way and then implicitly theorize about what is indicated.

When we show movies of rabbit parts coming together, pulling apart, we see that two such nodes are activated when apart, one node when together, and this tracks the psychophysics, etc. I skimmed the paper quickly and was quite pleased to discover a blob named after me! If we are talking about the function of some neuronal region, then the neuronal details will tend to matter more.

My work mentioned, in addition to psychossemantics for 1 and 2, develops a detailed alternative.

Was Psychosemantics a Failure?

I think we do not see psycnosemantics. It seems the visual system cares deeply about object-hood and the Gestalt psychologists saw this of course.

fofor Naturalistic theories of content are supposed to apply to all creatures, including humans. Or is it that kiwi that represent the snorf or red? If Fodor or Dretsky were to learn that their theory delivers determinate content assignments only for states of the rat or the c.

The only way to make progress that I know of involves making really strong, arguably non-naturalistic, assumptions about the kinds of properties that can enter into content-making relations.


Phototransducers increase fitness because they convert light into voltage fluctuations. Once these are acquired in an informational mileau, lsychosemantics can be combined into new complex concepts e.

And because there are so many free parameters it seems psychosdmantics bad case to push so hard. Well, at least you guys know that there is this problem with getting the contents right with teleosemantics. RV has it that the intentional content of verbal episodes is derived from cognitive states.

Anyway, I think you give an uncharitable interpretation of what I would put in premise 1.

Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers

This interpretation is automatic, generally, I assumebut the point is the determinate content may not be in the experience alone. But it will depend on the details, of course. Maybe it was instead just a widely held view. Not sure I accept it — I criticize the move in the afore-linked-to paper — but I think it is probably the best response. Maybe you should have a fight with Dan about that. Sexual selection is an interesting wrinkle for these types of issues.

I think van Gulick toyed with this idea.

Psychosemantics Quotes

Below that, I question the need todor more determinate content. But why do we think that the content is more precise than what is required to play the right perceptual role JNDs? Hi Josh, thanks for the follow-up.

I have no idea how to solve it. My point was that none of the naturalistic accounts on offer — specifically, versions of information-theoretic and teleological semantics — suffice to pick out fine-grained, determinate content of the sort we assume mental representation requires.

Nice pointer on the Lewis.

foodor The moral, I think, is that the determinate content of a state is, constituted by its relations not only to the environment though that may well be necessary, especially for perceptual states but also to other states and, in some all? My feeling was that looking at the work by Dan, Manolo, John D. As I wrote in the post to which you responded, rats psychhosemantics very smart animals, who exhibit complex, flexible, and oftentimes rational responses to events in their environment.


Gary Gates, back at Brown. Dretske brought the baby back in from fodorr puddle of bathwater, and the baby is here to stay even though it is not sufficient and nobody has ever said it was sufficient: Psychosmeantics that an example of content being influenced by other mental states? What the teleosemantic theory seems to be committed to is the idea that the visual system does not represent facial symmetry, but reproductive fitness. Call it the Received View RV.

Do you have a psychosemahtics intuition that it is highly specific the way we think our linguistic expressions are? Functional overlap is very common biologically. This is some basis for saying that it does not represent flies per se, but rather black dots, but that representing moving black dots is part of a good way to catch flies.

Godfrey-Smith mentions Explaining Behavior, and that is pretty common focus in the Dretske corpus. It really does depend on the details here, as Manolo intimated.

This rigid, inflexible behavior contrasts todor with the behaviors of rats, who learn quickly and hence respond flexibly to obstacles and threats. That seems right to me. Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. One could be that a teleosemantic theory assigns only generic content, like fitness or nutritious.