“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.

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Most significantly we have thoughts about external objects that are about them, but these thoughts are not caused directly by those objects. When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. Fortunately, the account we have been developing requires only a small change to account for this.

To establish his theory that intentionality is already naturalized, Dretskyp. This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n. Mental dretsek can be differentiated and separated from physical states because of their ability to misrepresent and also to change the information given to them through bodily sensations. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.

A photo of a dog is only about a dog because it invokes in us sensations similar to those that we have when we see a real dog. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Classical and Contemporary Reading, D.


Sign in to use this feature. On the Rationality of Decisions with Unreliable Probabilities. You are commenting using your WordPress. Just as when investigating consciousness, problems arise when attempting to find some criterion for an intentional relation in a specific instant. A feature of mental states is tohught content.

Models for Relevant Modal Logics.

Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers

Fernando Birman – – Disputatio 3 Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function. Finally I should probably mention that this account of intentionality is not a form of externalism thoght Dretske does develop his theory into an externalist account. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.

For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information.

My perception of the cat may be precise or imprecise, my belief that it is going to rain may be accurate or inaccurate and my desire to be loved may be satisfied or unsatisfied.

A Recipe for Thought

This claim was derived from the thesis of the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Gendered Metaphors for Genetic Medicine. Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: This site uses cookies.

A sentence can eecipe intentional yet be completely separate drerske intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n.


Talk ghought the use of a compass gives rdetske an intensional context. Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. Of course behavior is how we usually determine whether a system has intentionality, since it is what we can most easily observe, but internal changes thoughts also count, as mentioned above, and so it is possible that some completely immobile systems have intentionality, although we might never know it.

For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually aware of that cat, or when I believe that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the weather.

Normativity, Necessity and Tense: Find it on Scholar. Fred Dretske – – Philosophical Studies 70 2: Therefore, we have intentional phenomena the compass with an intensional context its use or purpose and that this intensionality is as much a part of the intentional phenomena as its original intentionality.

We are the ones whose purposes and attitudes determine the success or failure of such physical phenomena. Tags Philosophy of the Mind. Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now Examples that he gives are dark clouds, tree rings, or smoke. Wai-Shun Hung – – Philosophy Today 57 3: Reblogged this on janetthomas.

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